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Abstract6
Maritime container terminal operating companies have extended their role from node7
operators to that of multimodal transport network operators. They have extended the8
gates of their seaport terminals to the gates of inland terminals in their network by means9
of frequent services of high capacity transport modes such as river vessels (barges) and10
trains. These network operators face the following three interrelated decisions: (1) deter-11
mine which inland terminals act as extended gates of the seaport terminal, (2) determine12
capacities of the corridors, i.e. capacity of the transport means and frequency of service,13
and (3) set the prices for the transport services on the network. We propose a bi-level14
programming model to jointly design and price extended gate network services for profit15
maximization. The network operator does so while anticipating the decisions of the cus-16
tomers who choose minimum cost paths to their final destinations, and who always have17
the option to choose direct trucking offered by the competition. The model in this paper18
extends existing bi-level models in a multimodal format by including service time con-19
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straints and economies of scale. Considering the special structure of our problem, we20
propose a heuristic that provides near optimal solutions to our problem in substantially21
less time. Through experimental results in some realistic instances, we study optimal net-22
work designs while comparing sea port-to-door and sea port to inland port services and23
situations where transit time requirements do and do not apply. Our results show that24
when demand is relatively low, there are significant differences in the optimal network25
design for port-to-door versus port-to-port services. In the case of port-to-door services,26
the prices of services are determined by the competition and not by the design of the27
network, so the network is designed against minimum costs, and economies of scale are28
achieved by consolidating flows through a limited number of extended gates. The case29
of port-to-port services is different, i.e. revenues are enhanced not so much by reducing30
costs through the exploitation of economies of scale, but by exploiting the possibilities to31
dedicate extended gates to market segments for which the competition leaves room for32
higher port-to-port tariffs.33
1 Introduction34
Maritime container terminal operating companies around the globe have recently started to35
actively participate in land-side transport networks to enhance their connectivity to destina-36
tions inland while relieving some of the negative effects of freight transportation. Container37
terminal operators have done so by extending their role from node operators to that of multi-38
modal transport network operators. They have extended the gates of their seaport terminals39
to the gates of inland terminals in their network by means of frequent services of high capacity40
transport modes such as river vessels (barges) and trains. Moreover, customs clearance and41
other added value activities can be postponed until the containers leave the inland terminal42
gates instead of the seaport terminal gates (Veenstra et al. [2012]). In this format, the notions43
of extended gate operator and network operator can be used interchangeably, so from now44
on we will use the term extended gate operator to denote the network operator of our case.45
The extended gate operator at the tactical design of the land-side transport network faces the46
following three decisions: (1) determine which inland terminals act as extended gates of the47
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seaport terminal, (2) determine capacities of corridors, i.e. capacity of the transport means48
and frequency of service, and (3) set the prices for the transport services on the network. The49
three decisions are interrelated because inland terminals are located in relatively close dis-50
tances, usually close to industrial regions, so the hinterland of inland terminals is contestable.51
Thus, the network operator could connect the seaport terminal either to a limited number of52
inland terminals while using high frequent and high capacity transport services, or it could53
connect with more inland terminals while using less frequent services or lower capacity trans-54
port means. The price per TEU at each corridor should make the routing of all containers55
through that corridor cost effective compared to the service provided by the competition. It56
follows that, when a extended gate is meant to attract demand destined to regions other than57
its captive hinterland, for flow consolidation purposes, the price setting at its corresponding58
corridor should be low enough to make the path to the distant regions also cost effective.59
The above reduction in the prices would affect also the revenues the extended gate operators60
receive from the clients located in the captive hinterland of the extended gate.61
Port-Hinterland intermodal transportation is usually referred in literature as combined62
transport (Frémont and Franc [2010]), so this term will be used throughout this paper, and63
can take either the rail-road or waterway-road scheme indicating that usually the end haulage64
trip is performed by trucks. The international shipping of containers can be organized either65
under merchant haulage or under carrier haulage but port - hinterland transport of containers66
can also be offered under the so called terminal operator haulage (Notteboom [2008]). In the67
latter case, transport services are offered either as port-to-port services or port-to-door services.68
In case of port-to-door services, the terminal operator, that acts as an extended gate operator,69
orchestrates the transport of containers from the port to their final destination, while under70
port-to-port services he only offers transport from the seaport terminal to inland terminals. In71
other words, under port-to-door service the extended gate operator is assumed to control all72
links and nodes over the inland network while under port-to-port service it controls only flows73
on the high capacity corridors while the remaining is outsourced to competition. Under port-74
to-port service the prices should be set low enough such that they make the combined transport75
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path, via the extended gates, at least cost neutral to the best alternative service offered by the76
competition (Roso and Lumsden [2010]) for all containers routed through it. In this setting,77
the design of the inland transport network and the pricing scheme are interrelated. On the78
other hand, under port-to-door service the price of transport from seaport to final destination79
mainly depends on the best alternative transport service offered by the competition and does80
not depend on the routing of the container through the network since it is assumed that also81
the end haulage legs performed by trucks are offered by the extended gate operator. Thus for82
port-to-door services pricing and network design decisions do not have to be considered jointly.83
The term competition is used to denote other intermodal carriers or trucking companies that84
can offer alternative transport solutions to shippers than the ones offered by the extended85
gate operator. The last leg of transport is usually performed by trucking companies who also86
benefit from the use of extended gate concept since congested roads to seaport terminals are87
avoided while the pick up and drop off of containers is performed at the inland terminals, the88
above can increase sufficiently the number of trips they can perform per day.89
The profitability of the extended gate operator apart from the pricing also depends on90
the cost of delivering the network services, where the effective utilization of high capacity91
transport means provides the opportunity for economies of scale. Moreover, higher frequency92
of transport services reduces the average throughput times of containers which enlarges the93
market potential for such services. The trade-off between customer demand characteristics and94
carrier strategies should be considered, as it is supposed to lead the development of a variety95
of possible inland container routing patterns (Notteboom [2008]). Finally, consolidation helps96
to hedge against demand uncertainty [Lium et al., 2009].97
In this paper, we propose a model to jointly design and price extended gate network services98
to reap possible benefits. We contribute to the existing body of knowledge by extending Joint99
Design and Pricing bi-level formulations, as proposed by Brotcorne et al. [2005, 2008], to fit100
the Port-Hinterland multimodal network design by including service time constraints and high101
capacity modalities. Considering the special structure of our problem we propose a heuristic102
that provides near optimal solutions to our problem in substantially less time than it takes103
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CPLEX to solve the MIP equivalent formulation of our problem. Finally, through experimental104
results in some realistic instances we analyze the optimal network configurations under service105
type, demand and service time scenarios. Our results show that when demand is relatively low,106
which can be the case for several inland regions, there is significant difference in the optimal107
network configuration between considering port-to-port and port-to-door services. Moreover,108
the consideration of service time constraints in tactical network design shows that demand109
penetration through frequent services has a larger effect than achieving economies of scale110
through the use of bigger vessels.111
2 Literature Review112
In this section, we go through the most relevant literature to our research and position our113
work accordingly. First, we go through some general literature on intermodal transportation114
and then we review three steams of literature that we consider relevant for the port hinterland115
network design and in particular for our modeling approach. Our literature review is not116
exhaustive but focuses on specific modeling features that could be applied or adapted to117
facilitate the port hinterland multimodal network design. The development of the supply side118
of container transport networks has been studied extensively in the literature and is widely119
known as the service network design problem. Such problem formulations are increasingly120
used to designate the tactical issues of carriers (Crainic [2000]). The main considerations and121
several models on intermodal freight transportation can be found in Crainic and Kim [2006].122
However, contributions that could be exclusively facilitate the port-hinterland network design123
area are limited.124
A recent overview of the intermodal freight planning research is conducted by Caris et al.125
[2008]. The authors divide the contributions in the field according to the time horizon in126
strategic, tactical and operational models. Strategic decisions in intermodal transportation127
usually relate to long term decisions such as node and link infrastructure investments. When128
designing the extended gate network of a terminal operator existing infrastructure is used so129
pricing, capacity and frequency setting on the corridors are at the tactical level. Operational130
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decisions in this context come down to assigning containers to specific transport itineraries such131
that capacity is effectively utilized and time constraints set by the shippers are met. Decisions132
at the tactical level though can have a significant effect on the operational performance of such133
networks.134
Some work in our domain is currently in progress. Crainic et al. [2013]discusses the op-135
timization challenges that arise by the development of the dryport concept and proposes a136
service network design model, in a space-time format, for the rotation planning of barges be-137
tween seaport and inland terminals. van Riessen et al. [2013]proposes a path-based service138
network design model that investigates the use of contracted and subcontracted network ser-139
vices for the operation of an extended gate network at a tactical level, while assuming flexible140
due dates. Their findings show that transhipment cost at terminals should be reduced in order141
to paths with more than one stops at inland terminals to become cost effective.142
The extended gate operator aims at optimizing the design of his hinterland network while143
anticipating the routing decisions by the shippers of containers. Shippers can route their144
containers via links controlled by the extended gate operator or by its competitors or by a145
combination. Bi-level formulations of the network design problem capture the decisions of146
these three different actors involved.147
Port hinterland combined transport services compete with unimodal trucking services both148
in cost and service time dimensions so both should be considered at the tactical design of such149
networks. To address the cost effectiveness of combined transport we review and consider the150
joint design and pricing formulations of such networks. Moreover, we review contributions151
that model economies of scale when setting up high capacity corridors. Economies of scale152
achieved by the extended gate operator can lower his prices that are faced by the shippers153
and thus offset the additional handling charges of containers at terminals and provide cost154
incentives for the market penetration of such services. The market penetration of combined155
transport also depends on the expected service time of such services, which consist of transit156
times at the links and dwell times at the terminals. The dwell times depend on interdeparture157
times of barges and trains, i.e. the frequency of their departures which by definition depend on158
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the design of the network so should also be considered at the tactical port hinterland network159
design.160
2.1 Joint Design and Pricing of Transport Services161
The joint design and pricing of transportation networks is mainly modeled by bi-level mathe-162
matical models. Bi-level models are seen as a static version of the non-cooperative Stackelberg163
game. Most of them have in common that they try to maximize the revenues of an actor that164
is considered to be the leader and controls a set of arcs and nodes of the network while min-165
imizing the total cost faced by the users of the network. These features are in line with our166
view of an extended gate operator that endeavors to maximize his profitability by attracting167
flows through his network. The proposed network design must add value to the shippers by168
reducing their total cost. The main assumption of such formulations is that the competitors169
do not react to the final configuration proposed by the leader of the network. Due to the170
difficulties that arise when solving such formulations, which are proven to be NP-hard even171
in the simplest linear case, most papers focus on alternative modeling formulations of the172
problem and on the development of novel solution procedures. Contributions with managerial173
relevance in the sense of what is the impact of considering joint design and pricing in a network174
are yet limited.175
Brotcorne et al. [2000] introduce the freight tariff setting problem in which the objective is176
to maximize the revenues of a carrier who controls a set of arcs of the network, by setting the177
tariffs for using these arcs, while the flows over the network are determined in the second level178
minimizing the total transport cost faced by the users of the network. This is the simplest179
formulation since all terms are assumed to be continuous. The authors develop the single level180
equivalent bi-linear formulation of the problem with disjoint constraints, and solve it with181
heuristics based on the primal-dual heuristic proposed by Gendreau et al. [1996]. Brotcorne182
et al. [2001] extend their previous work by considering a multicommodity network in which183
the leader maximizes his revenues by setting the tolls on the set of arcs he controls. In this184
setting, again a primal-dual based heuristic is used with an extension that forces tolls applied185
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for each commodity to be equal and moreover an arc sequential heuristic is proposed.186
Brotcorne et al. [2005] further extend their previous model by considering the joint pricing187
and capacity setting problem in a multicommodity transportation network. This problem is188
formulated as a mixed integer bi-level program and is again solved by using a primal-dual189
based heuristic. This model incorporates the tradeoffs between revenue and cost generated for190
the leader when designing his network; it is stated that until then these issues were treated191
separately although they are intrinsically linked and should be treated jointly. The economies192
of scale principle is assumed to be satisfied by assuming the marginal cost of increasing capacity193
to be decreasing. In Brotcorne et al. [2008] the authors consider the joint design and pricing of194
a network by assuming that investment fixed cost apply to the leader for operating arcs over195
the network. This case is formulated as a mixed integer bi-level program with binary decision196
variables indicating whether or not an arc is used in a multicommodity transportation network.197
A novel heuristic based on Lagrangian relaxation is applied to incorporate the binary design198
variables in the solution method. An exact algorithm for solving the pricing problems on a199
network by partially and efficiently generating candidate solutions is presented in Brotcorne200
et al. [2011] while a tabu search algorithm is presented in Brotcorne et al. [2012].201
To the best of our knowledge, only a few bi-level formulations of the intermodal network202
design problem exist in the literature. Crevier et al. [2012] propose a path based bi-level203
formulation of the rail-road integrated operations planning and revenue management problem,204
at an operational level, while proposing some exact algorithms for its solution. The pricing205
of services depends on the prices set by the competition for the different service levels while206
the capacities of the corridors are obtained by solving a service network design model at the207
tactical level.208
The joint design and pricing of an intermodal network has been addressed also in other209
than bi-level programming formats. Li and Tayur [2005] jointly design and price an intermodal210
network by using a traditional marketing research approach for the pricing part. In this211
approach, a customer chooses an intermodal service based on its expected service level and is212
charged based on the best alternative transport solution cost which provides the same service213
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level. The paradox of this approach is that customers with different service level characteristics214
pay different prices while experiencing the same service level.215
2.2 Service time constraints216
The time dimension in service network design is usually incorporated at the operational level217
by considering time windows for the pick up and delivery of cargo. The service times are218
considered either by applying penalty cost for late deliveries or by imposing due date con-219
straints. The consideration of the time-dimension at both tactical and strategic intermodal220
network design is identified as a major research challenge by Crainic and Kim [2006]. Its221
importance is further enhanced by the fact that shippers tend to choose their carriers based222
on the perception of the service quality that they will receive (Crevier et al. [2012]). In the223
intermodal network design, the service quality perception can be associated with the service224
times of intermodal paths which depends among others on the frequency of services (Li and225
Tayur [2005]). It follows that the market penetration of combined services depends also on the226
tactical and strategic design of such networks in addition to their operational performance.227
Very few modeling contributions at a tactical level seem to take the time dimension explic-228
itly into account. In Crainic [2000] the main service network design formulations are reviewed;229
the service level is considered by the application of a minimum frequency constraint on spe-230
cific links over the network if they are opened. Such formulations cannot capture the demand231
penetration of a carrier based on the service level offered. In order to capture this effect, mul-232
ticommodity formulations with differentiated characteristics among the commodities should233
be developed. In Crainic and Rousseau [1986] this interaction is captured by considering unit234
delay cost in the objective function differentiated per commodity which depend on both con-235
nection frequency delays and transit times in each link over the network. First, unit delay cost236
can be difficult to approximate for each commodity, compared to setting a desired service time237
or a minimum frequency constraint per commodity. Second, the routing of containers in the238
network may greatly rely on the values of the penalty delay cost compared to the cost structure239
over the network, but still the potential of loosing some market to competition is not captured240
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in such models. Li and Tayur [2005] consider the expected total service time constraints set by241
the clients of the network and model that frequency dependent service time of paths consisting242
of link, capacity and frequency delays; the service frequency on the links is then bounded from243
below to satisfy the time constraints set by the clients. The last formulation of service level244
constraints seems to be the most considerable but the uni-modal formulation of the model as245
much as the non consideration of competition limits the capturing effect of market penetration246
based on the service quality offered.247
2.3 Network Flows and Economies of scale248
Economies of scale are usually incorporated in Hub and Spoke network formulations. Most of249
these contributions apply a discount factor a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, to the transportation cost between250
any two of the selected nodes of the network that will act as hubs. It is clear that this simplistic251
approach does not take into account the amount of flow that will pass through the inter-hub252
link, so post-assessment and post-validation of the solutions is needed. Considering the above253
can explain the shift to flow dependent economies of scale. Several authors consider piecewise254
linear functions to depict the economies of scale (O'Kelly and Bryan [1998], Horner and O'Kelly255
[2001], Klincewicz [2002]). Marginal cost is positive and decreasing in flow volumes.256
The former approach is considered to be wrong since assuming that the discount factors257
are independent of the flows can lead to false hub allocations and result interpretation (Kimms258
[2006]). The latter approach with flow dependent discount factors could be valid if the trans-259
portation is performed by a third party. Kimms [2006] proposes an alternative formulation260
of economies of scale as a non continuous increasing function of the flows, with break points261
denoting the multiples of the capacity of the mode in reference. We agree in principle with262
Kimms [2006] but we argue that the variable cost per unit transferred is minor compared263
to the fixed cost associated with operating (leasing) high capacity modes such as barges and264
trains; that is that the slope of the piecewise linear parts of the function should be close to265
zero. On the other hand, economies of scale exist when higher capacity assets are used even266
for the same modality, as we discuss in the cost formulation of our model.267
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3 Modeling268
The extended gate operator aims to design the capacities, frequencies, and prices of combined269
transport services on its network in such a way that profits are maximized. He does so while270
anticipating the decisions of the customers who choose minimum cost paths to their final271
destinations, possibly under service time related constraints.272
Wemodel the extended gate operator as a Stackelberg leader, followed by its customers. We273
formulate the above situation as a bi-level mathematical program where on the first level, the274
extended gate operator maximizes its profits which are given by the revenue of the extended275
gate services minus the fixed and variable costs of operating the extended gates. On the276
second level, the collective of customers minimizes the total system cost which consist of277
transportation cost and handling charges at the container terminals. The total network consists278
of links and nodes controlled either by the extended gate operator or by the competition. In279
particular, each hinterland destination can also be served by a direct trucking option offered by280
the competition. Therefore, prices set by the extended gate operator are always constrained281
by a competitive price from above. The model formulation extends the one proposed by282
Brotcorne et al. [2008] in a multimodal format by the consideration of economies of scale283
when assigning high capacity modalities to corridors and by the formulation of connection284
frequency dependent service times.285
3.1 Notation286
Let us consider an underlying network G = (N ,A) with node set N and arc set A. We assume287
that a node can be a supply, demand or a transhipment node in case it represents a deep288
sea terminal, client, and inland terminal, respectively. The set of arcs A is partitioned in289
two subsets; the set A1 which represents the candidate corridors to extended gates which are290
controlled by the leader and the set A2 which represents all remaining arcs which are controlled291
by the competition.292
We consider the multicommodity formulation of the problem in which each commodity,293
c ∈ C, represents a share of the weekly container demand for a specific Origin and Destination294
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(OD) pair, (Oc, Dc) ∈ N × N , under some service time constraint. The demand volume of295
a commodity c expressed in TEUs is denoted by dc, and represents the level of demand for296
both inbound and outbound flows regardless of whether the containers are full or empty. The297
inbound and outbound flows of containers are assumed to be balanced, since any inbound flow298
of full containers would lead to the return of an empty and vice versa. In reality, some empty299
containers dwell at the inland terminals until some demand for export containers is generated300
so they are full also on their return trip. Usually there exist weight and balance constraints301
for the loading of containers on barges and trains but such issues are addressed at an opera-302
tional level and are out of the scope of this paper. The desired service level is assumed to be303
expressed either as an upper bound for the expected service time, tc, or as a minimum weekly304
frequency constraint, f cij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, for the combined transport services. Considering305
the above demand formulation, we aim at analyzing the market penetration of combined ser-306
vices compared to direct transport based on the service frequency of high capacity modalities.307
The demand data requirements for the model can be derived by analyzing historical data or308
by having experts in the field approximating them. To facilitate our modeling, we use309
dcj =

dc,
−dc,
0,
j = Dc
j = Oc
otherwise
.310
We assume that cost of transport operated by the competition is linear in volume. The311
transport cost per unit (TEU) on an arc is denoted by Cij for all (i, j) ∈ A2 and the container312
handling charges at the transhipment nodes are also linear in volume and denoted byHij for313
all (i, j) ∈ A1
⋃A2. The handling cost applies to all arcs since every arc starts or ends at a314
seaport or inland terminal; the main difference between combined and road transport is that315
in the former handling charges are applied twice both at the seaport and the inland terminal316
compared to just the seaport handling charges that apply in the latter.317
We consider a set of barges, b ∈ B, with different cost and capacity characteristics. The318
cost of operating barges, from a barge operators perspective, consists of several components,319
such as assets, crew, fuel, and maintenance (Braekers et al. [2012]). On the other hand, the320
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cost faced by the extended gate operator, assuming that it does not use its own barges, is321
the price scheme proposed by barge operating companies which consists of the above costs322
enhanced by a profit margin for the barge operator. The leasing cost of a barge for a week323
is denoted by wb for all b ∈ B which includes both asset and staff cost required to navigate324
and operate the barges. Economies of scale apply in this leasing cost when higher capacity325
barges are selected; crew cost for barge navigation and operation are concave in the capacity326
of the vessel. A variable cost per round trip, vbij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B, is also considered to327
represent the fuel cost of barges which is assumed to be linear to distance traveled but variable328
to the size (capacity), Qb, of the barge. The number of round trips that a barge can perform329
to an extended gate, nbij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B is bounded from above by physical and330
technical characteristics like the distances traveled, sailing speed, handling times on seaport331
and inland terminals, and delays.332
At the first level, the extended gate operator designs and prices its services. First, the333
prices T ij for all (i, j) ∈ A1 are modeled as the price per TEU transferred through a corridor334
to and from an extended gate. This decision variable determines the revenue for the extended335
gate operator at the first level and part of the cost faced by the shippers at the second level.336
Second, the design variables ubij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B denote the number of barges of337
type b that are assigned to each extended gate while the integer design variables ybij for all338
(i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B denote the number of trips a barge of type b will perform at corridor (i, j),339
and yij for all (i, j) ∈ A1 denote the frequency of service on the candidate extended gate340
corridors. We also introduce the auxiliary Boolean variable y˜cij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C that341
denotes whether commodity c can be routed through link (i, j) ∈ A1 with respect to the time342
constraints. On the second level, the collective of customers chooses the minimum cost paths343
to transport their containers by deciding on the flow variables, Y cij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C344
and Xcij for all (i, j) ∈ A2, c ∈ C which denote the amount of TEUs assigned to each arc of345
the network.346
We assume the transport times, tbij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B and ttij for all (i, j) ∈ A2 for347
barges and trucks respectively. The expected dwell time of containers at seaport terminals348
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is assumed to consist of two components. First, a customs delay tnij for all (i, j) ∈ A1
⋃A2349
that would be the average time it takes for a container to be released by customs so that350
containers could leave the seaport terminal. Under the extended gate concept, containers are351
transported to the inland terminals under the customs license of the extended gate operator so352
these customs delays are considerably lower than the ones realized by direct trucking. Second,353
the frequency delays tdij for all (i, j) ∈ A1 which are assumed to be inversely proportional to354
the connections frequency and can be calculated by tdij =
1
2yij
. The frequency delays represent355
the expected time a container would have to dwell at the seaport terminal until the next barge356
itinerary would depart. For arcs served by trucks infinite frequency is assumed and thus zero357
frequency delays are considered for direct truck transport. The frequency of connections is a358
design variable in our model and thus the service time of combined transport is also a design359
variable that determines the market penetration of combined services.360
The parameter M represents a relatively large value for which we assume that M ≥ ∑
c∈C
dc.361
3.2 The Model362
3.2.1 First Level (FL)363
FL : max
T,Y,u,y
∑
c∈C
∑
(i,j)∈A1
T ijY
c
ij −
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
wbubij −
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
vbijy
b
ij (1)
∑
c∈C
Y cij ≤
∑
b∈B
Qbybij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (2)
ybij ≤ nbijubij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B (3)
yij =
∑
b∈B
ybij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (4)
y˜cOck ≤ 2 ·
(
tc − tnOck − tbOck − ttkDc
)
· yOck ∀ (Oc, k) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (5)
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Y cij ≤ y˜cijM ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (6)
y˜cij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (7)
yij ∈ N0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (8)
ubij ∈ N0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, b ∈ B (9)
The first level objective (1) represents the profits of the extended gate operator and consists364
of the revenue from the extended gate services diminished by the cost of operating the extended365
gate corridors. The capacity constraints are given in (2) which guarantee that the sum of the366
flows in each corridor is less than its capacity. Constraints (3) and (4) determine the service367
frequency in a corridor when several barges are assigned to it. Service time constraints are368
introduced in (5) and (6) that guarantee that the expected service time for each commodity369
should be less or equal than its desired service time, tc. It should be noted that in order to370
obtain a feasible solution it should hold that tc ≥ tnOcDc + ttOcDc for all c ∈ C; that is that the371
time restriction set by each commodity can always be satisfied by the quickest path, which is372
direct trucking.373
Constraints (5) are the linear equivalent of constraint (10) in which the left hand side374
expresses the expected service time for combined transport while the right hand side is the375
desired level of service time as expressed by the shippers for each commodity.376
y˜cOck
(
1
2yOck
+ tnOck + t
b
Ock + t
t
kDc
)
≤ tc ∀ (Oc, k) ∈ A1, (k,Dc) ∈ A2, c ∈ C (10)
The service time constraints could also be expressed as a minimum frequency at each377
corridor, f cij , so in that case constraints (5) should be substituted by constraint (11). The378
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minimum frequency requirements f cij can be derived from the desired service time t
c according379
to f cij =
⌈
1
2·(tc−tnOck−tbOck−ttkDc)
⌉
∀ (Oc, k) ∈ A1, (k,Dc) ∈ A2, c ∈ C.380
f ciky˜
c
ik ≤ yik ∀ (i, k) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (11)
In general bilevel programs, constraints that contain decision variables of both the first381
and second level should apply at the second level. Moving such constraints between the levels382
changes both the feasible region and the optimal solutions of the problem. So constraints383
(2)− (9) should originally apply at the second level. As it is shown by Brotcorne et al. [2008]384
these constraints can be moved from the second level to the first level for this special class of385
joint design and pricing problems.386
3.2.2 Second Level (SL)387
SL : min
X,Y
∑
ij∈A1
(T ij +Hij)
∑
c∈C
Y cij +
∑
ij∈A2
(Cij +Hij)
∑
c∈C
Xcij (12)
∑
i∈N
(
Y cij +X
c
ij
)−∑
i∈N
(
Y cji +X
c
ji
)
= dcj ∀j ∈ N , c ∈ C (13)
Xcij , Y
c
ij ≥ 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1,A2, c ∈ C (14)
The second objective (12) minimizes the total system cost. This cost consists of transport388
cost in arcs controlled both by the extended gate operator (what is seen as revenue for the389
leader is seen as cost for the follower) and by the competition, and of the container handling390
charges on both seaport and inland terminals. Constraints (13) are the flow conservation391
constraints.392
3.3 MIP Equivalent Formulation (MIP_EQ)393
In this section, we define the MIP equivalent formulation of our problem in order to be able394
to solve to optimality instances of our problem using commercial solvers like CPLEX. The395
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difficulty in solving this problem lies in the bilevel structure of our model and in the bilinear396
term,TijY cij , in the objectives. The bilinear term in the objective is usually eliminated by the397
use of its complementarity slackness constraints while the second level objective is replaced by398
its primal dual optimality conditions (Brotcorne et al. [2008, 2005]). This approach in addition399
to the constraints that force the equality of the primal and dual lower level objectives restrict400
every commodity to be routed exclusively through its minimum cost path. The above may be401
sufficient if one considers the uncapacitated version of the problem, where routing through the402
minimum cost path always provides the optimal solution for both the upper and lower levels403
of the problem, but can have significant impact when capacities over the arcs of the network404
are considered. In the latter case, the flows of a commodity might be routed through several405
paths either controlled by the extended gate operator or by the competition if the total flows406
on a corridor exceed its capacity. Flows of containers are attracted to corridors controlled by407
the extended gate operator when they result in path cost lower or equal to the minimum cost408
path offered by the competition.409
We propose an alternative approach to address the problems arising by the bilinear term410
in the objective, in which we obtain a linear equivalent formulation of this term. In our case,411
every port-to-door path can go through at most one tariff arc controlled by the extended gate412
operator. This simplifies the pricing scheme, since prices in different corridors do not interact.413
So we introduce the equilibrium level of the prices, γcij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C, that would414
make the routing of a commodity through a corridor economically effective. Setting the price415
at a corridor above or below that equilibrium level would prohibit or allow the flow of the416
corresponding commodity through that corridor. These level of prices prices should make417
the combined transport path cost neutral to the tariff free path offered by the competition,418
and we can obtain them according to γcOcj + HOcj + CjDc + HjDc = COcDc + HOcj for all419
(Oc, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C . The γcij takes both positive and negative values but of course the420
optimal price at a corridor, Tij , will take positive values such that revenues will be generated421
and will take the value of the equilibrium level of price for some commodity. The auxiliary422
Boolean variable, βcij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C, denotes which exactly equivalent level of423
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price of commodities will be the price at each corridor such that T ijY cij = γ
e
ijβ
e
ijY
c
ij for all424
(i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C, e ∈ C. The new formulation of the revenues is still bilinear, since it is the425
product of Boolean and continuous variables, but such a bilinearity can be easily linearized by426
the introduction of a continuous variable, δc,eij = β
e
ijY
c
ij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C, e ∈ C and the427
set of constraints (16)− (20).428
We substitute the second level (SL) problem with its optimality conditions (21) − (26).429
For this purpose some additional notation is used. The auxiliary Boolean variables Y˜ cij for all430
(i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C and X˜cij for all (i, j) ∈ A2, c ∈ C denote whether flows from commodity c can431
be routed through the associated links with respect to the total cost of the path they belong to.432
The price per commodity and arc is denoted by T cij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C and is restricted to433
take the same value for containers routed through the same corridor by constraints (24)−(25).434
Constraints (23) impose that flows can be routed through a corridor controlled by the leader435
only if they result in path cost lower than the one offered by the competition; that means that436
the total system cost is decreased when flows go through the corridors and thus the lower level437
objective is satisfied.438
The capacity (2), frequency (3) and (4), service time (5) and (6), feasibility (7)− (9) and439
(14), and flow conservation (13) constraints that apply in the original model should also apply440
in this model, but their are not duplicated here for space reduction.441
MIP_EQ : max
T,X,Y,u,y,β,δ
∑
e∈C
∑
c∈C
∑
(i,j)∈A1
γcijδ
c,e
ij −
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
wbubij −
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
vbijy
b
ij (15)
δc,eij ≤Mβeij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c, e ∈ C (16)
δc,eij ≤ Y cij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c, e ∈ C (17)
δc,eij ≥ Y cij −M
(
1− βeij
) ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c, e ∈ C (18)
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T ij =
∑
c∈C
γcijβ
c
ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (19)
∑
c∈C
βcij ≤ 1 ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (20)
Y cij ≤M · Y˜ cij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 (21)
Xcij ≤M · X˜cij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A2 (22)
T cOcj +HOcj Y˜
c
Ocj + (CjDc +HjDc) X˜
c
ij ≤ COcDc +HOcDc ∀ (Oc, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (23)
−M ·
(
1− Y˜ cij
)
≤ T cij − Tij ≤M ·
(
1− Y˜ cij
)
∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (24)
−M · Y˜ cij ≤ T cij ≤M · Y˜ cij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (25)
βcij , Y˜
c
ij , X˜
c
ij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C (26)
δc,eij ≥ 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, c, e ∈ C (27)
3.4 Modeling Considerations442
In this section, we discuss some of the main assumptions that underlie the Joint Design and443
Pricing models and compare them with the assumptions that underlie the usual network design444
models. Moreover we propose a transformation of our original model in a single level network445
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design model to assess the effect of joint design and pricing.446
3.4.1 Port-to-port service447
Our model in the present format fits the definition of port-to-port transport service. That is448
that the extended gate operator provides transportation services only among the seaport and449
inland terminals with high capacity modalities while the last leg of the transportation path450
from the inland terminal to the customer premises is organized by the competition. It follows451
that the prices over the extended gate services should be such that the total cost of the path452
through the extended gates should be at least cost neutral to the direct path provided by the453
competition.454
3.4.2 Port-to-door service455
In other cases the extended gate operator can offer port-to-door transport services. If so,456
prices do not depend on the routing of the containers but on the best alternative transport457
solution to that specific destination. Thus we can derive an alternative port-to-door network458
design model by fixing the prices per commodity for the entire path, T c. This will determine459
the revenues of the carrier which will be diminished by all costs for leasing and operating the460
barges as much as the transport cost and handling charges in order to obtain its profits, so the461
objective function will be equal to (28). The capacity (2), frequency (3) and (4), service time462
(5) and (6), feasibility (7)− (9) and (14), and flow conservation (13) constraints that apply in463
the original model should also apply in this model. Since the prices are considered fixed the464
bilinear term in the objective is eliminated, so a classical single level MIP is considered.465
max
X,Y,u,y
∑
c∈C
T cdc−
∑
(i,j)∈A1
Hij
∑
c∈C
Y cij−
∑
(i,j)∈A2
(Cij +Hij)
∑
c∈C
Xcij−
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
wbubij−
∑
b∈B
∑
(i,j)∈A1
vbijy
b
ij
(28)
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3.4.3 Extensions466
Some extensions of the model could considered to enhance the applicability of the model in467
real cases. First, a discount factor, αc for all c ∈ C with 0 ≤ αc ≤ 1, could be considered if468
one assumes that a client would be willing to shift to services offered by the extended gate469
operator only when they would lead to a cost reduction of his total cost. In this case the right470
hand side of constraints (23) would become (1− αc) (COcDc +HOcDc).471
Second, the cost and service time associated with transport services offered by the compe-472
tition could be further distinguished between trucking services with cost, Ctij for all (i, j) ∈ A2473
and service time ttij for all (i, j) ∈ A2, and combined transport services with cost Cbij for all474
(i, j) ∈ A2 and service time tbij for all (i, j) ∈ A2.475
4 Solution Approach476
We develop a heuristic to provide high quality solutions to our problem in an efficient way.477
Although complex heuristic and algorithmic procedures have been proposed for the general478
case of the Joint Design and Pricing problem (Brotcorne et al. [2005, 2008]) that could also479
apply here, we take advantage of the special structure of our problem and propose a simple480
heuristic that provides near optimal solutions at substantially less time compared to the time481
it takes CPLEX to solve the MIP equivalent formulation of our problem. In our case, every482
port to hinterland path can go through one tariff arc controlled by the extended gate operator.483
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4.1 Heuristic Development484
Algorithm 1
Step 0
Initialization.
γcOcj ← COcDc − CjDc +HjDc ∀ (Oc, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C .
Step 1
For each (i, j) ∈ A1, set Y˜ cij′ = 0 | ∀ (i, j′) 6= (i, j) , c ∈ C and solve MIP_EQ.
=⇒ T ∗ij ,Y˜ c∗ij .
Step 2
Take T ∗ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, Y˜ c∗ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1, ∀c ∈ C as input to Fl_A and solve the FL_A.
=⇒ z∗.
Step 3
Let C1 =
{
c ∈ C | ∑
(i,j)∈A1
Y˜ cij ≥ 2
}
.
Step 4
Let C2 =
{
c ∈ C | γc
i¯j
= T i¯j ∃ ¯(i, j) ∈ A1
}
.
Step 5
IF C1 ∩ C2 ∈ ∅
THEN go to Step 8
ELSE go to Step 6.
Step 6
For each c ∈ C1 ∩ C2,
Y˜ c
i¯j
← 0 and T i¯j ← γ′i¯j when γ
′
i¯j
= min
(
γc
i¯j
| Y c∗
i¯j
= 1
)
and solve the FL_A problem.
=⇒zc.
=⇒ z˜ = max (zc) and c˜ be the corresponding commodity.
Step 7
If z˜ > z∗then
z∗ ←− z˜
T ∗¯
ij
←− γ′
i¯j
Y˜ c∗ij ←− 0
go to Step 3
else
go to Step 8
Step 8
For fixed T ∗ij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A1 solve the MIP_EQ
=⇒z∗,ub∗ij ,y∗ij Y c∗ij & Xc∗ij
Notation:←Assign Value to a parameter, =⇒Output is generated by a program
In the Step 0, we set the value of the equilibrium level of prices, γcij for all (i, j) ∈ A1, c ∈ C,485
as it is discussed in section 3.3 of this paper.486
In Step 1 we solve | A1 |times the MIP Equivalent formulation of our problem, each time487
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allowing only one corridor controlled by the extended gate operator to open. This reduces488
sufficiently the size of the problem and thus CPLEX can solve the problem in substantially489
less time, as reported by Labbé et al. [1998]. Allowing only one corridor to open has the effect490
of concentrating the flows that would maximize the profitability of the extended gate operator491
in one corridor; thus the optimal price is set such that the cost for all commodities routed492
through the corridor is at least cost neutral to their best tariff free path. It follows that there493
is some revenue increase opportunity from commodities that had higher equilibrium prices494
than the price set on the corridor. It is clear that, if all corridors were available, the extended495
gate operator could increase the prices in some corridors to segment the market in favor of496
his revenue maximization. One might expect that for this reason T ∗ ≤ T opt. Although this497
does not hold true for the general capacitated version of the problem it holds true for the498
uncapacitated version of the problem.499
In Step 2, we aggregate all the individual solutions generated in Step 1 in one feasible500
solution by solving for a given price vector, T ∗, the FL_A model which is a constrained501
version of the first level (FL) problem, as explained below.502
The FL_A model is a constrained version of the FL model, and it takes the values of T ij503
and Y˜ cij as inputs. The prices are fixed to the values defined by the heuristic, so the bilinear504
term in the objective function is eliminated. Second, constraints (21) from the MIP equivalent505
formulation of the problem are included. Constraints (21) for the given values Y˜ cij , defined506
by the heuristic, substitute the second level objective since they prohibit the assignment of507
flows to corridors that are part of paths with higher cost than the one offered by competition.508
Last, constraints (29) substitute the demand conservation constraints (13) of the second level,509
in the sense that the summation of flows of one commodity in all corridors should not exceed510
its demand volume. Some commodities can be routed through several corridors controlled by511
the extended gate operator since their resulting path cost is lower than the one offered by512
competition. Considering the price vector of the extended gate operator, they will be routed513
through the paths that generate the highest profit for the extended gate operator. The solution514
of this problem is feasible since both capacity and service level constraints are considered while515
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the feasibility of the second level is guaranteed by constraints (21) and (29).516
∑
(i,j)∈A1
Y cij ≤ dc ∀c ∈ C (29)
In Step 3, we identify which commodities are assigned to more than one extended gate517
corridors. If no commodities are assigned in more than one corridors, the aggregation of the518
individual solutions is the optimal solution.519
In Step 4, we identify the commodities for which their equilibrium level of prices is equal520
to the prices set on the corridors controlled by the extended gate operator.521
In Step 5, we check whether the intersection of the two sets of commodities obtained in522
Steps 3 and 4 is empty. If it is empty, our heuristic terminates in Step 8. Otherwise it continues523
to Step 6. In case a commodity, c, satisfies both conditions in Steps 3 and 4, then one may opt524
to increase the price at the corresponding extended gate corridor and thus prohibit its routing525
through it. In this manner, the commodity is guided via extended gates where the prices are526
higher, although it remains competitive. The remaining flows in the former extended gate527
corridor will also generate higher revenues.528
In Step 6, for each commodity that satisfies the conditions in Steps 3 and 4, we try to529
increase the price on the corresponding corridors and solve the FL_A problem while keeping530
the optimal solutions.531
In Step 7, we check whether the maximum among the solutions obtained in Step 6 is higher532
than the best solution found until now. If it is better, the corresponding variables are updated533
and the heuristic makes another iteration from Step 4 else it terminates in Step 8.534
In Step 8, we solve the MIP equivalent formulation of our original problem for the tariffs535
obtained such that the design and flow decision variables are determined.536
4.2 Heuristic Assessment537
In order to assess the performance of the heuristic described in section 4.1, we generated538
instances randomly and we solved them by both the MIP equivalent program using CPLEX539
12, and by our heuristic. Both the heuristic and the MIP equivalent program were formulated540
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Instance Inland
Termi-
nals
Client
Nodes
Commodities CPLEX
CPU
(Sec)
Heuristic
CPU (Sec)
Objective
1 10 20 30 25.53 4.46 99.38%
2 10 20 60 141.97 10.62 98.56%
3 10 30 30 32.67 4.29 98.22%
4 10 30 60 367.48 13.62 97.99%
5 20 20 30 395.95 6.34 99.77%
6 20 20 60 500.13 18.60 99.58%
7 20 30 30 320.56 8.23 99.30%
8 20 30 60 500.27 26.24 99.28%
Table 1: Heuristic Assessment
and solved in MATLAB 2012b, while we set for CPLEX a time limit of 500 sec to solve the541
problem. For the cases where this limit was exceeded, we consider the optimal upper bound542
achieved.543
The instance generator works as follows: first the skeleton of the network is generated544
by defining the number of source, sink and transhipment nodes, the coordinates of which545
are randomly generated in two-dimensional space following the uniform distribution within a546
radius defined by the user. The source nodes are connected with the sink nodes directly with547
arcs, and then the source nodes are connected with the transhipment nodes; these will be the548
arcs controlled by the leader, finally the transhipment nodes are connected with all the sink549
nodes. The lengths of all arcs are equal to the Euclidean distances between the nodes, and550
moreover the associated cost is determined by a fixed cost and a variable cost linear in the551
distance of each arc. Finally, the commodities are randomly generated by defining the sink552
and source nodes, the amount of flow and service level requirements in terms of minimum553
frequency required to assign the flows in a specific arc. We solved ten instances for every554
setting in order to assess the performance of the algorithm.555
The results are summarized in Table 1 where the average computation times and the556
average gap from the optimal solutions are presented for 10 randomly generated instances with557
the specifications stated in the first three columns of the matrix. CPLEX needs significantly558
more computation time on average even for small or medium sized instances, while we see that559
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in both cases the computation time mainly depends on the number of commodities considered560
while the number of nodes of the network has significant effect only on the computation time561
of CPLEX. The gap between the optimal solution and the one obtained by the heuristics seems562
to be less than 2% in average. By the construction of our heuristic we know that if the optimal563
tariffs are reached then the optimal solution will be reached.564
5 Experimental Results565
In this section we formulate a stylized but realistic example and run experiments in order to566
assess the effect of the different considerations on network design problem. In particular, we567
study whether there are any differences in the optimal network design when we assume port-568
to-port versus port-to-door services and also we assess the effect of considering service level569
constraints in the tactical service network design. The optimal multimodal network design570
are case specific and may depend on physical characteristics of the network, the demand571
distributions over the network and other parameters, so our results may not be generalized572
but they do demonstrate the capabilities of our model to capture the tradeoffs among revenue573
maximization in offering services, cost minimization in setting up the combined transport574
network, and of demand penetration through frequent services on corridors.575
Although we develop a stylized example, all cost structures considered in this paper are576
obtained by real costs covered by a confidentiality factor so we use monetary units, m; full577
details on the cost structures can be found in van Riessen et al. [2013]. We consider a network578
consisting of one seaport terminal and 3 inland terminals; see Figure 1. The inland terminals579
are located closely to each other, so their hinterland can be considered contestable. That means580
that container demand for one inland region can be served via an extended gate located in581
another region. The costs of road transport are presented in Table 2 and are calculated based582
on the formula: Cij = 76.4 + 1.06 · distance (i, j). In order to simplify the network we assume583
that demand is destined to the inland regions of inland terminals, so only the fixed cost584
applies for the end haulage leg from the inland terminal to the customers premises located in585
the same region. The weekly fixed costs for barge leasing and the variable costs per barge trip586
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Figure 1: Stylized Example Physical Network
ST IT1 IT2 IT3
ST 76.4 232.4 263.6 336.4
IT1 232.4 76.4 118 190.8
IT2 263.6 118 76.4 159.6
IT3 336.4 190.8 159.6 76.4
Table 2: Transportation Cost via Road (m/TEU)
are presented in Table 3. The additional handling charges at inland terminals is set equal to587
23m/TEU.588
In order to assess the performance and the main differences of using the different network589
design formulations we set up an experiment by differentiating the demand volumes over590
the stylized network, which ranges from 180 to 2.340 TEUs per week. We assume that the591
demand is equally distributed among the OD pairs. Finally, the demand is further organized592
in commodities to capture the different service time requirements which are shown by the593
minimum service frequency (Table 4).594
#
Capacity
(TEUs)
Weekly Leasing Cost Variable Cost per Trip Number of Round Trips
ST-IT1 ST-IT2 ST-IT3 ST-IT1 ST-IT2 ST-IT3
1 100 7.500m 225m 270m 375m
3 3 2
2 200 10.000m 285m 342m 475m
Table 3: Barge Types and Characteristics
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OD pair Com
Minimum
Service
Frequency
Percentile
ST-IT1
1 1 20%
2 3 50%
3 6 30%
ST-IT2
4 1 20%
5 3 50%
6 6 30%
ST-IT3
7 1 20%
8 3 50%
9 6 30%
Table 4: Experimental Setting
5.1 Port-to-port vs Port-to-door haulage595
In this section we study whether any significant differences appear when assuming port-to-port596
versus port-to-door services while solving the two models discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.597
The graphs in Figure 2 should be evaluated with care and be read as follows; In the horizontal598
axis of each graph there is the weekly demand of containers, a variable in our experiment,599
which is considered to be equally distributed over the three inland regions and also further600
organized in commodities according to Table 4. The optimal capacity setting (Figure 2. a601
and b), connection frequency on the corridors (Figure 2. c and d) and the flows of containers602
(Figure 2. e and f) over the network are shown. The results shown in Figure 2 are interrelated603
and should be read together. In Figures 3 and 4 the optimal network configurations for some604
cases are graphically presented.605
We observe that when demand is relatively low all the flows are consolidated in one corridor606
namely the central one ST-IT2 which is opened with 2 small barges achieving a frequency of607
6 trips per week; that means that service time constraints for all commodities are met when608
routed through the ST-IT2 corridor. In case port-to-door service is assumed this remains609
the optimal design until the demand over the network exceeds the capacity of the corridor610
(Figures 4.a and b). On the other hand, if port-to-port service is assumed the ST-IT1 corridor611
is opened earlier for the achievement of revenue maximization through pricing (Figure 3.b). In612
both cases, there is a range of demand where both ST-IT1 and ST-IT2 corridors are opened by613
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assigning to them one (3 trips per week) and two (6 trips per week) small barges respectively614
(Figures 3.b and 3.c), where containers destined to the IT1 region with high service level615
requirements (Commodity 3) are routed through the ST-IT2 corridor.616
It is obvious that considering joint design and pricing has a significant effect on the optimal617
network configurations compared to usual cost minimization network design. First, consider-618
ing the port-to-door services provides more flexibility of the routing on containers through the619
network with the result of more flow consolidation in fewer corridors especially when demand620
is low. Second, when port-to-port services are considered, revenue maximization has a signif-621
icant effect and high frequency is set in all corridors to service frequency requirements of all622
commodities such that more dedicated services are offered.623
Assuming that demand originates or is destined at the inland regions and that demand is624
equally distributed among the inland regions may not be realistic. Nevertheless, our results625
show significant differences in the optimal network design and assuming unbalanced demand626
and the actual locations of shippers only has greater effect on the differences among the optimal627
network design between assuming port-to-port and port-to door services.628
5.2 Impact of Service level constraints629
In this section we solve the same instances without considering the service time constraints630
and compare them with the results presented in the previous section. The graphs in Figure 5631
should be read in contrast to those presented in Figure 2.632
First we observe that considering service level constraints has a significant impact on633
the optimal network design, especially when demand is relatively low. We observe that the634
effect of economies of scale through the use of bigger barges dominates the optimal network635
configurations. So high frequent connections are achieved only when demand is high. Second,636
we observe that all corridors are opened for lower demand realizations; that is because for this637
case it is assumed that all demand can be satisfied even with low frequency services. That638
means that beyond a demand threshold in each region, a corridor to that region is opened.639
Higher demand will also be covered by the same corridor although the capacity on that corridor640
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will increase accordingly. This means that the quality of service provided in each corridor,641
controlled by its frequency, does not influence the routing of containers based on their service642
time characteristics. Again one can observe differences between assuming port-to-door and643
port-to-port services since in the latter the revenue maximization through pricing forces the644
extended gates to open earlier than they do in the former.645
6 Conclusions646
In this paper we presented two models for the tactical design of multimodal port-hinterland647
transport services, namely for the design of port-to-port and port-to-door services. The models648
capture the tradeoffs among revenue maximization, economies of scale and market penetration649
through setting frequency of services. We contribute to the existing body of modeling literature650
by extending the joint design and pricing bilevel formulations to the multimodal nature of651
such services and we add service time constraints to capture the different transport time652
performance among different modalities. We propose a simple heuristic approach that provides653
near optimal solutions in substantial less time than CPLEX.654
In addition to the modeling contributions of this work some managerial insights, can be655
drawn from our research. First, it seems that the cost of installing capacity on corridors656
compared to the possible realization of revenues does not prohibit the setting up of high657
frequent services to meet service time constraints and increase their market penetration. High658
frequent connections are set up even for instances with low demand and bigger vessels are659
selected only after high frequent services are established. In most of the solutions though it is660
clear that the installed capacity on the corridors is underutilized; this can be explained by the661
low break-even utilization points of barges use. Installing high capacity corridors both lowers662
total cost and provides buffer capacity to carriers to hedge against demand variability (Lium663
et al. [2009]).664
Considering port-to-door services provide more consolidation opportunities because it gives665
more flexibility in the routing of commodities due to the disconnect between routing and pric-666
ing. When port-to-port services are assumed the revenue management (or market segmenta-667
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tion) through pricing that results in more dedicated services is more important than achieving668
economies of scale through the use of bigger vessels. It should be noted though that different669
assumptions underlie the two different service types and this leads to different optimal com-670
bined transport network configurations. So in case of port-to-port services, where not all links671
are controlled by the same authority, the optimization models should be adjusted accordingly.672
The model we propose in this paper is in this direction.673
Moreover our results show that when an extended gate operator serves several close regions,674
he has more flexibility in the design of its hinterland network. For example, he can set up675
frequent services in one central corridor (or with higher flows) to satisfy fast moving containers676
for all close regions while also setting up services of lower frequency to transport slow moving677
containers with lower total cost.678
The present paper consider the competitive environment to be exogenous. An extension679
of the research in this paper could concern the interaction between two or more extended680
gate operators that both design and price sub-networks to serve the needs of a contestable681
hinterland, The above would require an MPEC formulation of the problem which is still not682
studied extensivily in literature, but could also capture the seaport calling selection of shipping683
lines based on their hinterland connectivity.684
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(a) port-to-port (b) port-to-door
(c) port-to-port (d) port-to-door
(e) port-to-port (f) port-to-door
Figure 2: Experiment results - With service level constraints
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(a) Demand =180TEUs per week (b) Demand = 540TEUs per week
(c) Demand=1080 TEUs per week (d) Demand=1980 TEUs per week
Figure 3: Optimal Network Configurations port-to-port haulage
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(a) Demand =180TEUs per week (b) Demand = 540TEUs per week
(c) Demand=1080 TEUs per week (d) Demand=1980 TEUs per week
Figure 4: Optimal Network Configurations port-to-door haulage
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(a) port-to-port (b) port-to-door
(c) port-to-port (d) port-to-door
(e) port-to-port (f) port-to-door
Figure 5: Experiment results - Without service level constraints
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